3. Literature review
“We perceive in concepts – not as totally naïve and innocent eyes, but eyes that can recognise in a new image a familiar shape”. (O’Toole & Beckett 2010:88)
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Revaluating the concrete
3.3 Knowledge representation and animation
3.4 The pedagogical-technological divide
3.1 Introduction
Research is inconclusive about how beneficial animations actually are for teaching and learning as there are so many variables and contexts. As Betrancourt and Chassot note “…the key issue is not whether animation is beneficial to learning but rather when and why animated instruction may be effective”. (2008:146 original emphasis) The theoretical space which informs this literature review involves cognition in general and conceptual consolidation in particular.
3.2 Revaluating the concrete
Before moving into the main discussion in section 3.3 "Knowledge representation and animation" some mention must be made about the meaning and use of the words "concrete" and "abstract." Discussions about conceptual change are informed by the cognitive development literature although Keil and Newman (2008:83) are careful to note that these two issues are not synonymous. Cognitive development is as much about the reorganisation of knowledge as it is about the acquisition of new knowledge. Conceptual consolidation is more specific and localised but it too is informed by the reorganisation of knowledge.
In the seminal book "Constructionism" (1991), Turkle and Papert proposed a "revaluation of the concrete." (1991:161-192) They questioned whether abstract thinking is really the most important type of thinking and offer alternative views of a softer, relational approach concluding that "formal reasoning is not a stage, but a style”. (Turkle & Papert 1991:175 original emphasis) In the same volume, Uri Wilensky had more to say on Piaget's view of abstract. Wilensky suggested that everything is abstract until you understand it. The term concretizing (Wilensky 1991:194) was then used as a metaphor for understanding. Abstract ideas can take form and "set" just like actual concrete. Difficult concepts begin to set when students are able to represent, manipulate and interact with them. “Concepts that were hopelessly abstract at one time can become concrete for us if we get in the ‘right relationship’ with them”. (Wilensky 1991:198)
Interestingly, this "revaluation of the concrete" (Turkle & Papert 1991), although further developed by Wilensky (1991) was not developed any further in any of their research since that time. An implication from that 1991 discussion has become one of the central assertions arising from this Storyboard thesis twenty years later. The implication is that abstract and concrete are not fixed categories to which different types of knowledge intrinsically belong. These categories could best be described as different ends on a learning continuum. The relative movement of ideas from abstract to concrete depends on the comprehension of each concept, by each person, on a case-by-case basis. These dynamics will now be explored as a way to frame the debate on issues pertaining to knowledge representation and animation.
3.3 Knowledge representation and animation
“Representation is never neutral: that which is represented in the sign, or in sign-complexes, realizes the interests, the perspectives, the positions and values of those who make signs”. (Kress & Mavers 2005:173) Animations which have been carefully designed to communicate conceptual topics provide digital depictions of the organisational structure of the author’s logic. Kress & van Leeuwen have noted that the person who makes a representation displays their interest in an object through the “criterial aspects” evident in the depiction (2006:7). One of the primary claims from the Storyboard project is that explanatory animations can be cognitive models. Bonini’s Paradox also reminds us that a model works best when only the essential features are present.
The following story shared by one of my University lecturers during a Child Psychology in Education class in 1998 introduces some of the key dynamics in this discussion. The point was made that asking children to draw a picture of what they understand can quickly demonstrate their comprehension of a topic. The example was about the water evaporation/condensation cycle being taught in a primary school where the teacher boiled a kettle of water to show the water changing from a liquid state to vapour. When children were then asked to draw how this could occur in nature, assumedly with rivers and clouds etc., one child drew a kettle placed out in the wilderness! "It appears that many students do not interpret teacher metaphors and analogies in the intended manner. Rather, they transfer attributes from the teachers' analog to the target...in a literal and undifferentiated sense". (Harrison & Treagust 1996:511)
A representation can take on a life of its own when the viewer (or author) forgets that it is supposed to represent something else. Ackermann (1991) notes that "Drawings are not analogues of the ideas that they express”. (1991:286) This observation was in the context of revisiting Piaget's water-level experiment. One of the children drew a ribbon around a bottle to depict the water level and then proceeded to treat the drawn ribbon as an actual ribbon rather than the water level. The child's actual understanding was clarified through discussion and interview. The director's commentaries in the Storyboard methodology help retain the author's intention and provide a context for interpretation.
You can fake comprehension to some extent by remembering keywords but representation reveals all. Harel quotes Papert on this issue as "representations are the deep structure of any kind of knowledge, while algorithms are the surface structure of any kind of knowledge”. (Harel 1991:462 original emphasis) In the weekly operation of the Storyboard project, the children's progress was displayed through the representational imagery that they were constructing. This is because explanatory animations are multimodal texts.
Jewitt (2008) notes that mode and meaning are deliberately aligned when constructing multimodal texts: “My claim here is that how knowledge is represented, as well as the mode and media chosen, is a crucial aspect of knowledge construction, making the form of representation integral to meaning and learning more generally”. (2008:241)
Bruner's three modes of representation (1966:11) also have relevance to this study:
(Table 1: Bruner’s three modes of representation) |
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A mode is an expression and not a neat category as there is often some overlap between modes. Bruner’s three modes can exist simultaneously throughout the process of creating an explanatory animation. The method is enactive because you physically act on a tangible element under construction. Using a mouse on a screen is just as tangible as manipulating wooden blocks. Bruner never proposed that these three modes be integrated but rather presented the modes of representation as belonging to additional considerations of economy and power. (1966:44)
Kirschner, Sweller & Clark (2006) note that people use mental images to construct their own learning whether they are directed to do so or not. "Learners must construct a mental representation or schema irrespective of whether they are given complete or partial information. Complete information will result in a more accurate representation that is also more easily acquired”. (Kirschner, Sweller & Clark 2006:78) Mental images are constructed and not merely observed and accepted verbatim. Watching a screen provides the stimulus for internalisation. Mayer (2001) considers multimedia learning to be an active process of selection, interpretation and integration although his focus was on the viewer rather than the author of an animation.
Animation is not a single mode of representation but a medium or composite mode as the author can pick and choose various other modes and combine them in creative ways to achieve maximum effect. "It is the integration of three modes in consort - graphic, narrative and embodied - that makes visual narrative a powerful source for children's learning, representational thought and creativity". (Wright 2010:20)
3.4 The pedagogical-technological divide
This section is named after John Dron's journal article "The Pedagogical-Technological Divide and the Elephant in the Room". (Dron 2012) Dron argues that a "technology" is simply a way of doing things and that pedagogy, or rather "pedagogies", are in fact technologies in that they too are a way of doing things. Pedagogies may be technologies but technologies are not tools. "Tools and technologies are not the same thing: the same tools may be used in or as quite different technologies". (Dron 2012:25) This distinction is then further expounded with the example of a screwdriver having an infinite number of uses.
It’s not what we do with technology but rather what we do in general. What we do with our tools is the technology. The elephant in the room is all the other aspects which we aren't looking at which might be as human and intrinsic as the sense of humour of the teacher. "As a research community, those of us involved in technology-enhanced learning need to find better ways to identify the (usually unobserved) aspects of a learning experience that a focus on technology keeps in the shadows". (Dron 2012:34)